Taxation and Accountability in Developing Countries
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Does taxation motivate citizens to hold government accountable? If so, how is taxation increased and tax evasion decreased?

This evidence brief seeks to answer two questions. One, does a fiscal contract exist between citizens and governments in developing countries? Two, assuming that such a fiscal contract exists or can be created, how can governments increase taxation and decrease tax evasion? 

This evidence brief is part of the Learning from Evidence series, a learning process undertaken by the Transparency and Accountability Initiative to engage with and utilize the evolving evidence base in support of our members’ transparency and accountable governance goals. We are pleased to have partnered with MIT’s Governance Lab and Twaweza on this initiative. This series comprises a variety of practice- and policy-relevant learning products for funders and practitioners alike, from evidence briefs, to more detailed evidence syntheses, to tools to support the navigation of evidence in context.

This blog was written by Lily L. Tsai, Guillermo Toral, Blair Read, and Varja Lipovsek.